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Summary
For several years, some Members of Congress and other military analysts have
argued that the U.S. Armed Forces are too small to adequately meet all the requirements
arising in the post-Cold War era and particularly in the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT).  In January 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) acknowledged a problem
by temporarily adding 30,000 troops to the authorized active duty end strength of the
Army.  Congress addressed the issue by raising end strength in the FY2005
authorization bill, H.R. 4200 and S. 2400 (P.L. 108-375).  This report describes the
background of this action, current Administration planning, and assesses several
significant issues for Congress.  The report will be updated.
Background.  Throughout the Cold War, end strength of the U.S. active duty force
never dropped below 2.0 million personnel and peaked at over 3.5 million during the
Korean and Vietnam Wars.1  From 1989 to 1999, end strength dropped steadily from 2.1
million to 1.4 million where it has remained.  Force structure dropped even more with
active Army divisions, for example, going from 18 to 10.  Expectations that military
requirements would diminish, however, were not realized: U.S. forces deployed to new
missions in such places as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and, with the
recent advent of the GWOT, to Afghanistan and other far-flung places.  The results of
Operation Iraqi Freedom suggested that U.S. ground forces, in particular, are stretched
thin.
Concerns about increased requirements on a smaller force surfaced over ten years
ago, and initially focused on readiness.  A Defense Science Board report in 1994 found
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“pockets of unreadiness” attributed to turbulence in the armed forces.2  Members and staff
of the House Armed Services Committee discerned problems in the field and challenged
Administration assertions that readiness remained high; by 1997 they asserted that “The
post-Cold War defense drawdown and the expanding demands of manpower- intensive
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations ... are placing at risk the decisive military edge
that this nation enjoyed at the end of the Cold War ...” 3  Other studies highlighted
problems stemming from the operating tempo of units (OPTEMPO) and personnel
(PERSTEMPO).4  Various solutions were proposed.  Many suggested fewer overseas
commitments but no Administration stemmed demands for U.S. forces.  Congress
mandated DOD to compensate soldiers who were deployed too long or too often but
September 11, 2001 caused that law to be waived.  Technological advances made
transforming U.S. forces  more combat effective against conventional forces, but could
not substitute for  manpower needed in the unconventional and asymmetric environments
of “stability” operations.  In contrast, some charged that the Army, in particular, was
resisting such “constabulary” operations and therefore managed its personnel inefficiently.
The combat phase of the 2003 Iraq War was won quickly with fewer divisions than
many analysts expected.  The occupation phase, however, soon involved some 220,000
forces.  At the first anniversary of combat, DOD  engaged in the “largest troop rotation
since World War II.”  All active Army divisions were involved.  Indicators that forces
were stretched thin included Reserve Component and Marine Corps units committed for
over a year (shorter tours had been the norm); many personnel either came under “stop-
loss” orders that kept them from leaving service, were extended in their tours, or were
anticipating multiple combat tours; ceremonial companies from The Old Guard5 in
Arlington, VA, were deployed to Djibouti; and no Army division was available as a
strategic reserve (air and naval forces were  shifted to cover key contingencies).6  A House
bill was introduced to increase the Armed Forces by 83,700 personnel for five years.7
Various Senators have proposed either adding one Army and one Marine division or
permanently increasing the Army by 10,000 soldiers.8  No decreases to end strength have
been proposed.  Whether as a result of internal or external pressures, in January 2004
DOD addressed the end strength question.
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Administration End Strength Initiative.  Before the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) on January 28, 2004, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter
Schoomaker, testified that he had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense to increase
end strength of the Army by 30,000 personnel on a temporary, emergency basis.9  He
argued that a permanent, legislated increase would be unwise and unnecessary.  He
asserted that a permanent increase would create a burden on  planned defense budgets in
the out years, citing $1.2 billion annually for each increase of 10,000 troops.  Some
ongoing programs were presented as, over time, providing a more efficient and usable
force structure within current Army end strength.
General Schoomaker began making  organizational changes shortly after he became
Army Chief of Staff on August 1, 2003.  He ordered divisions to create more combat
“modules” by forming four new brigades from their existing three brigades and divisional
support forces.  Once implemented, this would provide 10 additional brigade-equivalent
maneuver elements for the rotation base.  Including planned Stryker brigades could
eventually raise the number of brigades available from 33 to 48.10  He is pursuing a “unit
manning” policy, rather than rotating individuals to deployed units.  He would also shift
from the “Cold-war” mix of combat capabilities to one geared to the less technologically-
advanced enemies, joint operations,  and stability-type operations recently experienced.
Examples include reducing air defense, artillery, and ordnance unit strength and
increasing military police, civil affairs, and transportation capabilities.  
The Army and DOD have also been seeking other ways to glean manpower
efficiencies.  General Schoomaker noted that 5,000 soldier positions were converted to
civilian last year — making more soldiers available for deployment — and he anticipated
finding 5,000 positions in the coming year.  This raises issues about the numbers of
civilians and contractors needed by the Services.  Another organizational initiative has
been “re-balancing” the mix of Active Duty and Reserve Component forces to increase
fairness and flexibility in deploying the total force and to allow initial deployments with
fewer reserve forces.  Other measures have potential to reduce military manpower
requirements over time, such as reposturing U.S. forces overseas and base closings and
realignments at home scheduled for 2005.
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Considerations for Congress.  Congress debated the Administration’s end
strength initiative in the FY2005 defense authorization bill. The Senate version, S. 2400,
endorsed the Administration’s proposal to increase the Army by 30,000 temporarily over
three years.  The House version, H.R. 4200, boosted the Army by 30,000, added 9,000
Marines, and designated $1.2 billion of Iraq War funding towards associated costs.  The
result (P.L. 108-375) was to increase the Army by 20,000 and the Marine Corps by 6,000
in FY2005, allowing for a further increase in FY2006.11  Various considerations could
influence the future debate.  The “right” size for the military addresses  military
requirements now and in the future.  The Administration acknowledges current stresses
on the force, but interprets the situation as a “spike” in requirements that will  return to
a lower, more manageable “plateau.”  Critics counter that the war on terrorism and
occupation of Iraq could endure for many years and that the continuing potential for
sudden, major crises, such as in Korea, requires a robust U.S. military force.12  One’s view
of  the future determines one’s idea of acceptable risk. 
Other considerations may also influence the debate.  Predicted federal deficits may
create pressures to restrain the overall budget, and competition between sectors may call
forth “guns versus butter” tensions.  Within DOD, competition for funding will continue;
many will argue that personnel costs must be constrained so that research and
procurement for the transformational weapons of the future will be adequate.13  Some may
be influenced by  implications of the end strength debate for particular military
installations and defense industry employers.
Should End Strength Be Increased, and by How Much?  Many voices in
Congress and in the military community have publicly supported an increase, and few
have argued against it unconditionally.14  Proposals now range in magnitude from 10,000
permanent Army positions to the Administration’s 30,000 temporary positions to 83,700
for five years (introduced and supported by Democratic Members).15  Some proposals are
couched in force structure terms rather than manpower figures.  Adding two combat
divisions, for example, could easily exceed 30,000 spaces when large numbers of
necessary combat, basing, and institutional support troops are provided.16
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Critics of the Administration proposal deem it inadequate and largely based on
accounting for current troop numbers rather than on an injection of fresh troops.  The
increase of Army end strength to 510,000 is already less than the 30,000 advertised, given
that Congress authorized 482,400 in FY2004 (P.L. 108-136).  Further, the Army has
recently and regularly exceeded its authorized end strength as it concentrated on meeting
wartime requirements — 493,000 was even reported.17
A formal mechanism for determining the size of the U.S. military is the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), last published by the Bush Administration in September 2001,
per P.L. 103-62.  As the next one will not likely appear until 2005, the QDR process
provides little guidance for current force level debates.  The 2001 QDR was considered
ambitious, premised on fielding military capabilities to prevail in any two theaters of
operation in overlapping timeframes.  It also planned to maintain and prepare forces for
smaller-scale operations in peacetime, occupations, and a rotational base for forward-
deployed forces.  Besides these operational requirements, the QDR emphasized the goal
of rapid transformation into the future force.  The QDR looked at force structure rather
than end strength.  In retrospect, it did not predict the stress of trying to meet all
developing wartime, peacetime presence, and transformation requirements at the same
time.  Many observers believe that U.S. troops, active and reserve,  have been bearing the
load of that stress for some time and that an increase in end strength — failing an
unexpected, sudden victory in the War on Terror — is justified to help relieve that stress.
Should Any End Strength Increase Be “Permanent” or “Temporary”?
The Administration proposal to increase the Army’s size would only be in effect for four
years.  This is based on the premises that, in the interim, manpower requirements might
decrease, initiatives to find greater efficiencies within the current force might bear fruit,
or both.  If so, the Army will have avoided some near term and longer term cost
differentials between permanent and temporary solutions.  A permanent increase would
require additional resources for recruiting, retention, and training activities.  Also, any
change upwards in permanent force structure could possibly negate some anticipated
savings from base closures in the upcoming BRAC process.
Critics assert that DOD premises may be faulty; a sudden reduction in military
requirements bucks the tide of recent history, and, finding more manpower through
internal efficiencies has probably been a goal not well-realized by this and preceding
Administrations.  Whether or not one accepts  DOD premises, the method by which it
plans to implement a temporary increase is subject to criticism.  Rather than recruiting all
new personnel, current personnel are being retained, many through the imposition of “stop
loss” orders to extend tours of duty.  Some question the fairness of making those currently
serving sacrifice further to avoid recruiting additional personnel for the future.18  Some
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argue that paying the costs for a permanent increase now would avoid the risk of
discovering a few years from now that the forces are inadequate.  Congress could revisit
and correct end strength in each annual authorization bill.19  Others,  believing the
situation will ease, would argue that taking such a step is premature.
What Kind of Forces Do We Need?  Specific types of forces needed will be
defined by perceptions of future requirements, recent experiences, and response to current
stresses.  Congress influences the type of forces to be acquired by allocating end strength
among the four Services.  Further refinements occur as specific weapons systems and
materiel are developed and procured, and through the oversight process.  Whether or not
to create dedicated “constabulary” forces remains an issue.
Substantial ground combat forces will likely be needed as “stabilization” efforts in
Afghanistan and Iraq have no defined end point20 and other nations of concern, such as
Iran, Syria, and North Korea, retain a potential for future armed confrontation.  Combat
campaigns in both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated the value of U.S. Special
Operations Forces.  SOF strength is being increased and is particularly important to the
War on Terrorism, but that strength is accounted for within the Services that contribute
their personnel to SOF units.  In Iraq, the ability of U.S. mechanized infantry and armored
forces to survive and prevail against both regular and nonconventional enemy forces, even
in urban areas, was striking.  To reinforce success, some advocate maintaining and
increasing units armed with Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.21
For some time, the Services have denoted various specialized units as being Low
Density/High Demand.  Examples from the Army are civil affairs, military police, and
transportation units.  Examples from the Air Force are SOF air crews, air controllers, and
crews for airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and electronic warfare (EW)
aircraft.  LD/HD assets are, as are infantrymen, needed both in combat and stability
operations.22  Some analysts have recommended that DOD organize one or more division-
level headquarters to specialize in stability operations.23  This supposes that such a
capability will continue to be needed and that specialized units could improve the
planning, effectiveness, and efficiency of U.S. participation in stability operations.  This
new unit, although it might include some existing combat elements, likely would not
reduce current pressures for an increase in end strength.  
